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The central question this paper investigates is whether bank loan is a special 
form of debt. Bank financing reduces information friction and has several other 
contractual benefits for the borrowing firms. There is also a cost to this 
relationship, which is the hold-up problem. With hold-up, banks can charge a 
non-competitive rate to a borrower. With a large and comprehensive bank loan 
sample, I investigate the effects of bank financing on firm valuation represented 
by Tobin’s Q, with these benefits and costs in mind. I find that, in aggregate, 
bank financing has a positive effect on firm valuation, even after controlling for 
debts in the capital structure, and the endogeneity of bank financing. Cross-
sectionally, opaque firms and firms with financing constraints have lower 
valuation when they have outstanding bank loans, providing support for the 
hold-up story. I also test the channel of the effect of bank loan by investigating 
bank loan availability vs. bank loan usage.  
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
In the lending market, there exists inherent information asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowing firms regarding the quality of the borrowing firms (adverse selection). 
Even after a lending decision is made, the lender needs to exert effort to monitor the 
borrower in order to prevent the borrowing firm from investing sub-optimally 
(borrower moral hazard). In a theoretical framework, Fama (1985) and Diamond (1984) 
find that a single private lender such as a bank can mitigate information friction caused 
by adverse selection and moral hazard existing in the lending market. Boot (2000) notes 
that these risk mitigation benefits are further magnified if the lending bank has a strong 
past relationship with the borrowing firm, through which the bank could produce 
borrower-specific durable and reusable information.  
Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) point out that the potential costs of bank loans 
can reduce the aforementioned benefits. The informational monopoly created by the 
proprietary information gathered by the bank through repeated interaction can “hold 
up” the borrower, and enable banks to charge (ex post) a high loan interest rate. 
Borrowers cannot switch banks since those who wish to switch are tagged as a lemon, 
whether its true financial condition is healthy or not. 
Bank financing is an important part of firm debt structure. According to Colla, 
Ippolito, and Li (2013), on average, 22% of total debt of US public firms come from 
drawn line of credit, and 21% come from term loans.1 This is quite significant since it 
means that, on average, 43% of total debt come from bank loans. If we look at the 
proportion of firms taking on these types of loans, 51% of firms take on line of credit, 
while 47% of firms take on term loans. 
So the central questions here are: (1) are bank loans special; (2) what is the 
wealth effect of bank financing on borrowing firms; and (3) how can we test it 
empirically? Loan announcement literature attempts to answer these questions. James 
                                                 
1 Refer to Table 2 of Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013). 
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(1987) finds that bank loan announcements are associated with a positive and 
significant firm stock reaction, while privately placed or public debt announcements 
result in zero or a negative stock reaction. Historically the consensus has been that bank 
loan announcements are always met with a positive and significant firm stock reaction. 
This has been challenged by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011). They argue that there is 
selection bias in the prior literature in that firms decide what loans to announce. After 
correcting for the selection bias, Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) document that, with 
a representative albeit small sample, the abnormal return was insignificantly different 
from zero. 
However, with a large sample, researchers who study loan contract terms 
generally find bank loans result in positive benefits to borrowing firms. Berger and 
Udell (1995), and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) show empirically 
that having a bank relationship gives borrowers benefits in terms of a lower loan rate 
and collateral. On the other hand, in specific circumstances, Santos and Winton (2008), 
Hale and Santos (2009), and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find evidence of hold-up 
costs that hurt the borrowers. Thus, we have a puzzle in that a relatively large sample 
of event study of 800 loans finds no benefits from bank lending, yet, a number of large 
sample studies using loan contract terms do find evidence of benefits. An ideal test that 
could resolve this issue would be an event study of all loans, announced or not, on the 
first date the loan information becomes public.  This is not feasible as it is very difficult 
to determine the date that information on a non-announced loan becomes public. 
In this paper, I adopt an alternative approach that combines the elements of 
both of these approaches. On the one side I investigate the wealth effect using the 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm valuation. On the other side, using this enables me to 
use a comprehensive sample for tests, not subject to the announcement bias.  
I study two questions: (1) is the aggregate effect of bank loans on firm 
valuation insignificant, or significant and positive; and (2) is there a cross-sectional 
variation in the valuation effect of bank loans? If we believe that capital structure is 
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irrelevant and Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) really have found the nexus of the issue, 
then the effect on firm valuation shouldn’t be significantly different from zero. If we 
believe that bank loans increase firm value through monitoring and certification, the 
aggregate effect should be positive and significant.  
I look at the cross-sectional variations in the effect of bank loans on firm 
valuation, motivated by the hold-up costs earlier documented. Most of these were 
documented for specific situations, e.g., for firms prior to IPO, unrated firms, etc. There 
is little that examines applicability of hold-up in a large sample. I specifically look at 
opaque firms and firms with financing constraints, e.g., firms without rating and thus 
without access to public debt market. If the hold-up story holds and these firms are 
more susceptive to informational hold-up by their lending banks, then we expect the 
incremental effect of bank loans for such firms to be negative. On the other hand, if the 
hold-up costs can be curbed as shown theoretically in von Thadden (1995), then it is 
possible that opaque firms and firms with financing constraints benefit more from 
information friction mitigating benefits of bank loans. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and 
Srinivasan (2011) show that bank relationship is indeed more beneficial for opaque 
firms in terms of loan contract terms. In this scenario the incremental effect of bank 
loans on firm valuation should be positive for opaque firms and firms with financing 
constraints. 
I focus on public companies from U.S.A. as the base sample, and restrict the 
sample periods between 1990 and 2009. I generate a bank availability dummy, which 
takes the value of one for a specific calendar year if the firm has bank loan available. 
The loan could be in the form of term loan or revolving credit. Information for this 
dummy variable is extracted from either Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan 
or Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. While past empirical investigations on 
loan announcements or hold-up costs usually focus on a small number of firms 
(Houston and James (1996) looked at 250 publicly traded firms from 1980-1990), I 
look at close to 7,000 firms with more than 70,000 firm*year level observations. Thus, 
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I am able to provide comprehensive and general empirical findings on this research 
question. 
I seek to test my hypotheses by using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm valuation, 
and look at the effect of bank loans on firm valuation, controlling for different firm and 
industry characteristics. I look at this problem from two levels, one at the aggregate 
level and the other at the cross-sectional level. While at the aggregate level I focus on 
bank availability dummy only, for cross-sectional study I look at the interaction of bank 
availability dummy and with variables that proxy for information asymmetry and 
financing constraints. Bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has bank loan 
granted to itself for a specific calendar year. It could be in the form of term loan or 
revolving credit. 
I measure the presence of bank financing with a bank availability dummy, 
which takes a value of 1 if a firm has access to bank financing in a specific year. I 
emphasize the word ‘availability’ here to distinguish available bank loan vs. drawn 
bank loan. Later, I conduct additional analysis to investigate the difference between 
these two concepts. As in many empirical financial studies, there are potential risks of 
endogeneity and selection bias for banks’ grant of a bank loan to a client. These 
concerns are carefully address in the later part of introduction, and in subsequent 
empirical analyses. 
In the baseline estimation, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity at 
firm levels and control for possible endogeneity coming from omitted variables, I 
estimate my model with firm fixed-effects. In addition, to control for the effect of 
macroeconomic changes on firm valuation through the years, I add year fixed-effects 
to the baseline model as well. At aggregate level, the baseline model finds that the 
effect of bank financing on firm valuation is positive and significant. The coefficient is 
0.099 in the baseline model. This is an economically significant result, since this 
suggests that Tobin’s Q for firms with bank financing is 7.2 percent higher than those 
without bank financing. 
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To test my cross-sectional hypothesis, I interact bank availability dummy with 
variables that proxy for information asymmetry and financing constraints. The results 
support the hold-up hypothesis but not the information friction reduction hypothesis: 
Bank availability dummy interacted with proxy variables for high information 
asymmetry has a negative and significant coefficient. Similarly, bank availability 
dummy interacted with proxy variables for high financing constraints also has negative 
and significant coefficients. 
A potential issue with the results of the baseline model is that the bank’s 
decision to offer bank loan might be endogenous. Banks may prefer firms with higher 
valuation. In this case, Bank availability dummy is a choice variable that is correlated 
with unobservables that affect firm’s valuation Q. Thus, Bank availability dummy is 
endogenous. I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to correct for this 
endogeneity bias. As the instrument variables, I use lagged industry proportion of bank 
financing, and lagged industry proportion of rated firms. 
I also allow for the possibility that there is selection bias when firms raise bank 
financing vs. when they do not. Selection bias can happen when an individual cannot 
be in both states in the sample. If an individual is in the treatment group, we only 
observe the treatment outcome for this individual. If an individual is in the control 
group, we only observe the outcome without treatment for this individual. I use 
treatment effect regression (Heckman correction) with both selection equation and 
treatment equation to address this issue. 
The results with these corrections are strongly consistent with the baseline 
results. I continue to find a positive and significant aggregate effect of bank financing 
on firm valuation. 
To further investigate the channel of the monitoring and certification power of 
bank financing, I look into the issue of available bank loan vs. drawn bank loan. The 
reason here are two-fold: (1) I would like to understand if a mere presence of a bank 
loan renders the banks to have influence on their borrowing firms or this influence only 
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exists when the firm actually borrows from the banks; and (2) in my main analysis, I 
use a dummy variable (bank availability dummy) as the main independent variable. An 
interesting question would be what the effect of incremental amount of bank loan is on 
firm valuation. It would make more sense to use the actual amount of drawn bank loan 
to answer this question, instead of available amount of bank loan. This distinction exists 
because of revolving credit, a major category of bank loans. I find that even with the 
distinction of available bank loan and actual drawn loan accounted for, and the 
incremental effect of drawn bank loan in mind, the coefficients on bank availability 
dummy are positive and significant, and are still close in magnitude to the baseline 
results. 
Grossman and Hart (1982), and Jensen (1986) demonstrate that risky debt 
serves as a costly disciplining mechanism to reduce the agency cost that arises from the 
separation of ownership and control. To address the question of whether what I observe 
is a debt effect instead of a bank financing effect, I look at the subsample of firms with 
positive long-term debt or total debt. The coefficients on bank availability dummy 
remain positive and significant for these subsamples. Consistent with the findings of 
Santos and Winton (2008), the cross-sectional analysis finds that the hold-up problem 
is somewhat mitigated for these subsamples with outstanding long-term debt or total 
debt. 
In order to find out whether my empirical findings are driven by two very 
different samples, I look at the positive long-term debt sample next. I find that even 
within the positive long-term debt sample, the dichotomy between the two samples 
with and without bank loan availability still holds. Still, I find that the effect of bank 
financing on firm valuation is positive and significant. Interestingly, once within the 
positive long-term debt subsample, the magnitude on bank availability dummy is 
almost the same across difference specifications for control variables. 
To summarize, with a comprehensive and representative loan sample, I look at 
the effect of bank financing on firm valuation represented by Tobin’s Q, and find the 
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effect to be positive and economically significant. Cross-sectionally, instead of 
bringing more benefits to opaque firms because they suffer more from information 
asymmetry, having outstanding bank loan has an incremental negative effect on firm 
valuation for opaque firms. This shows that cross-sectionally we have the evidence of 
hold-up costs for these firms. Qualitatively similar results are found for firms with 
financing constraints. 
My results are consistent with the notion of Fama (1985) that bank loan is a 
special form of debt, since its presence has a positive effect on firm valuation. Cross-
sectionally, the evidence suggests the story of hold-up for more opaque firms and firms 
with financing constraints, in line with the theory of hold-up costs by Rajan (1992) and 
Sharpe (1990). 
Since very few research looks at the effect of bank loans on firm valuation with 
complete universe of bank loans, announced or not, this paper fills a void in the 
empirical literature that investigates the pros and cons of bank financing on firm 
performances with an emphasis on the cross-sectional differences as well.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide theoretical backgrounds 
and establish my hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I discuss data construction methods and 
variable definitions. In Chapter 4, I provide summary statistics, empirical specification 





CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A bank’s role as a financial intermediary has been an enduring subject of economics 
and corporate finance. At the center of the debate is whether bank loan is a special form 
of debt. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is irrelevant. If 
capital markets are perfect and investment decisions are fixed, then the value of a firm 
does not depend on its financing decisions. However, the requirements of the perfect 
capital markets are often violated. There exists inherent information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowing firms regarding the quality of the borrowing firms 
(adverse selection). Even after a lending decision is made, the lender needs to exert 
resource to monitor the borrower in order to prevent the borrowing firm from investing 
sub-optimally (borrower moral hazard). In a theoretical framework, Fama (1985) and 
Diamond (1984) find that a single private lender such as a bank can mitigate 
information friction caused by adverse selection and moral hazard. Boot (2000) finds 
that these risk mitigation benefits are further magnified if the lending bank has a strong 
past relationship with the borrowing firm, through which the bank could produce 
borrower-specific durable and reusable information. 
  With a theoretical framework, Fama (1985) and Diamond (1984) show that 
bank loans are special. The first benefit of bank loan is the certification role of bank 
loans. Repeated interaction between a bank and its borrower reduces information 
asymmetry, and the borrower establishes enough credibility so that it can eventually 
borrow through public debt or equity market. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) 
and Diamond (1991) show that the bank’s monitoring role works as a certification 
device that facilitates access to capital market funding. The second benefit is the 
monitoring role of bank loans. Bank debt can monitor the borrower more effectively 
than public debt since bank debt is more concentrated and has the capacity to screen 
and intervene. The kind of bilateral information exchange between a bank and its 
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borrower is much more exclusive and confidential compared to information gathered 
in the public market.  
When there is a strong past relationship between a borrowing firm and a bank 
producing borrower-specific reusable information, the information friction mitigating 
benefits are further magnified (Boot, 2000). Relationship lending has several 
contractual features that are beneficial for the borrowers. Bank loans are more flexible 
than public debts since renegotiation is a possibility. Discretion enables decision 
making based on more subtle and non-contractible information (Boot, Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1993). The ability to stipulate explicit covenants is another beneficial feature 
of relationship banking. It can help control potential conflicts of interest and reduce 
agency costs, and yet is flexible enough since a renegotiation is possible upon the 
arrival of new information which renders the existing covenants suboptimal. The third 
contractual feature is the collateral requirements. Chan and Thakor (1987), and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) show that collateral can effectively mitigate moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in loan contracting.  
While acquiring information for monitoring purpose is costly for a bank, its 
enduring role as an important lender gives it better incentive to make such an 
investment. Although I investigate the effect of bank financing instead of relationship 
banking, ordinary bank loans also share the above contractual benefits.   
There are also potential costs of bank loans that can drain the aforementioned 
benefits. The informational monopoly created by the proprietary information gathered 
by the bank through repeated interaction can “hold up” the borrower, and enable banks 
to charge (ex post) a high loan interest rate. Borrowers cannot switch banks since those 
who wish to switch are tagged as a lemon, whether its true financial condition is healthy 






2.1   Effect of Bank Loan on Firm Valuation 
The central question of interest is whether bank loans are special, and how to test it 
empirically. One important literature on the effect of bank loans on the borrowing firms 
is the loan announcement study. They study the effect of bank loan announcements on 
firm stock reactions. The seminal paper by James (1987) investigates whether bank 
loan announcements and renewals contain value about the future prospects of the firm, 
within the framework of event studies. With the US loan data, James (1987) finds that 
bank loan announcements are associated with a positive and significant firm stock 
reaction, while privately placed or public debt announcements result in zero or a 
negative stock reaction. Lummer and McConnell (1989) find supporting evidence that 
positive stock price reactions to announcements are only restricted to loan renewals, 
but not to loan initiations. However, this finding is not well duplicated in some follow-
up studies such as Best and Zhang (1993), and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995). 
Overall, until recently, the consensus has been that the wealth effect of loan 
announcements is positive. 
A rather surprising finding by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) says it 
otherwise. They find that selection bias has been driving the previous consensus. The 
immediately interesting finding is that the sample used by Billet, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (1995) fails to represent the loan universe, and that significant abnormal 
announcement returns are confined to their smallest firms. Loan announcements are 
rare and driven by such factors as information asymmetry and perceived materiality. 
Their small sample, which better represents the loan population, produces an abnormal 
return insignificantly different from zero. As a result, they refute the view that loans 
are a special form of finance or that private and public debt differ in significant ways. 
At a more focused scale, relationship banking literature investigates the impact 
of bank relationship on contract terms of bank loans, including cost of credit, collateral, 
loan size, credit availability and maturity. In a theoretical framework, Boot and Thakor 
(1994) show that long-term bank-borrower relationships are welfare enhancing and 
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result in loans that are below the spot market cost. Berger and Udell (1995), and 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) show empirically that having a bank 
relationship gives borrowers benefits in terms of a lower loan rate and collateral. 
Fernando, May and Megginson (2012) study how the Lehman collapse affected 
industrial firms that received investment banking services. They find that equity 
underwriting clients experienced an abnormal return of around -5%, on average, in the 
7 days surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy, amounting to $23 billion in aggregate risk-
adjusted losses. Lin, Liu and Srinivasan (2014) show the importance of bank financing 
to firm valuation through the prism of TARP. They find that in post-TARP period, 
aided banks reduce the supply of credit. They also find that clients of aided banks suffer 
a valuation loss of 3.01% in post – TARP period. 
The primary cost of relationship lending is the hold-up problem. Banks obtain 
an informational monopoly by acquiring proprietary information through repeated 
interactions with the borrowing firms. This hold-up problem refers to a phenomenon 
where a bank with private information about the borrower can sharply increase the 
borrower’s interest rate when their relationship matures, an increase that is not justified 
by the credit risk of the borrowing firm.  Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) find that 
banks could charge higher loan rates through this mechanism. Borrowers may become 
reluctant to borrow due to the hold-up effect, which may result in losses of valuable 
investment opportunities. If a borrower does establish a bank relationship, it will suffer 
the hold-up problem, and will have difficulty in switching since it will be labeled as a 
lemon.  
Empirically, researches like Houston and James (1996), Santos and Winton 
(2008), Hale and Santos (2009), and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find evidence that 
banks do price their information monopoly. Houston and James (1996) find that for 
firms with a single bank relationship, the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to 
the importance of growth opportunities proxies by Tobin’s Q and R&D expenses. They 
find the relationship to be positive when there are multiple bank relationships. Santos 
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and Winton (2008) find that firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads 
and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions, compared to firms with public 
debt market access. Hale and Santos (2009) find that firms are able to borrow at lower 
interest rates after their bond IPO, since new information about the firms is revealed at 
their bond IPO. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find direct evidence where a new bank 
initially charges a low loan rate but eventually ratchets it up sharply. 
An ideal test that resembles the loan announcement study could be done if all 
loans are announced. Then I could have checked the average abnormal returns using 
the entire loan sample. As only some loans have announcement dates in my sample of 
universe, which is considered a representative sample in Maskara, and Mullineaux 
(2011) standard, I cannot conduct the conventional loan announcement study if I want 
to use the entire sample. Since I am interested in the wealth effect of the bank loans, I 
choose to investigate the effect of bank loans on firm valuation represented by Tobin’s 
Q in a panel data setting. 
To summarize, on the question of whether bank loans are a special form of 
debt, while historically the consensus had been that bank loan announcements have 
resulted in a positive stock price reaction for the borrowing firm, and it is found in the 
relationship banking literature that past bank relationships bring further benefits to the 
borrowing firms in terms of loan contract terms, a recent study by Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011) refute the notion that bank loan is a special form of finance. 
Accordingly I test the following two hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 0: Bank loan is not a special form of debt. Controlling for other firm and 
industry characteristics, in aggregate, having bank financing has no effect on firm 
valuation measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, in aggregate, 
having bank financing is beneficial to firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q. The 
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actual magnitude of this effect depends on how much a borrower can benefit from such 
bank financing, net any cost incurred by hold-up costs. 
 
There is a paper that is somewhat relevant when it comes to bank financing 
and firm valuation. Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) investigate the effect of 
bank equity ownership on Tobin’s Q of firms in Japan. Their focus is on the bank’s 
role both as a shareholder and a creditor, and they look at the relationship between 
firm’s equity ownership by banks and Q ratios in Japan. They find that the relationship 
between the bank equity and Tobin’s Q is non-monotonic. At a lower level of 
ownership by main banks, Q ratio falls as the bank equity ownership rises. At a higher 
level, this relationship is mitigated and in some cases reversed. This is because when a 
bank’s stake in the borrowing firm is low, the bank’s role as a creditor manifests itself 
as being in conflict with shareholders, which hurts firm valuation. When a bank’s stake 
is high, the bank’s role as a shareholder also becomes important and thus banks work 
towards aligning creditor-shareholder conflict, resulting in improvement in firm 
valuation.  
This study on the US firms is different from Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani 
(2000). While in Japan, banks have cross-holdings of both debt and equity of the 
borrowing firms, equity holdings by commercial banks are rare in the US unless in 
occasions of debt to equity swap. Thus, we don’t have the issue of how firm valuation 
changes when the bank equity of the borrowing firm increases.  
 
2.2   Cross-sectional Effect of Bank Loan on Firm Valuation 
Next, consider the cross-sectional difference. It is reasonable to conjecture that opaque 
firms such as small firms, young firms and firms without rating may suffer more from 
the holdup cost. The same is true for firms with financial constraints. They are much 
more limited in securing alternative funding sources like multiple bank relationships or 
the public debt market compared to their peers, which means their current bank can 
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hold them up with high interest rates. Then why would opaque firms and firms with 
financing constraints still want to borrow from a bank despite of high hold-up costs? 
First, for opaque firms and firms with financing constraints, alternative funding sources 
are limited. As such bank loan is possibly their only choice of debt funding. Moreover, 
there may be a certification benefit of obtaining bank loans. As Diamond (1994) 
demonstrates, borrowers use bank loan as a way of establishing sufficient credibility 
before accessing the capital markets. Relationship lending increases the availability of 
credit to information-sensitive borrowers, who will suffer most from information 
asymmetry in the public debt market. Even though having bank loans may have 
negative incremental values, these other benefits potentially outweigh the concerns 
coming from the hold-up cost and will motivate small or young firms to still pursue 
bank financing. My Hypothesis 2A is based on the theory of hold-up cost. 
 
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): Cross-sectionally, for opaque firms and firms with financing 
constraints, having bank financing is less beneficial to firm valuation measured by 
Tobin’s Q, due to high holds-up costs and limit in alternative financing sources, 
controlling for other firm and industry characteristics. 
 
On the other hand, von Thadden (1995) shows that opportunism by informed 
lenders can also be controlled by more efficient use of long-term contracting 
possibilities. If we consider the benefit of bank loans that mitigates information friction, 
then one might argue that opaque firms like small firms and firms without rating might 
benefit more from bank financing. Thus opaque firms with bank loans should have 
higher firm valuation compared to those without bank loans. We also see some 
evidence of this in various studies. 
Indeed, within the context of relationship banking literature, Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) find that relationships are especially valuable when 
borrower transparency is low. They find that the decrease in loan spread for relationship 
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borrowers disappears if the borrower is in the top 30% ranked by asset size. Similar 
dissipation of relationship benefits occurs if the borrower has public debt or is part of 
the S&P 500 index. Relationships are also associated with shorter debt maturity for the 
lowest quality borrowers, signaling more frequent monitoring from banks.  One can 
also conjecture that the availability of bank financing will ease the liquidity constraints 
of firms with financing constraints. My Hypothesis 2B is based on the above argument.  
 
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): Cross-sectionally, for opaque firms and firms with financing 
constraints, having bank financing is more beneficial to firm valuation measured by 
Tobin’s Q, since they benefit most from the power of bank loans to reduce information 





CHAPTER 3   DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
I start with data sources in section 3.1. Then in section 3.2, I discuss mapping of bank 
loan data to Compustat data, and in section 3.3, I discuss further data cleaning steps. I 
provide key variable definitions in section 3.4. 
 
3.1   Data Sources 
I obtain data on available bank loans for public firms from two sources: Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s Dealscan database (LPC), and Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
syndicated loan data, restricted to all loans originated in the U.S.A. Loan types of these 
bank loans include term loans and revolving credit. Firms choose whether they wish to 
borrow against part or all of the revolving credit. For information on how much bank 
loan a firm has actually drawn, I obtain it from Capital Structure data of S&P Capital 
IQ. I obtain institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters 13F database. Firm 
balance sheet information comes from Compustat and firm level stock information 
from CRSP. My sample period is from 1990 to 2009. 
I use LPC Dealscan database to identify firms that have obtained loans from 
banks and the timing of their borrowing. The LPC database mostly reports information 
on syndicated loans, but it also reports information on some non-syndicated loans. 
Previous study (Santos and Winton, 2008) finds data to be well populated from 1990, 
so I restrict my sample to 1990-2009. This results in 38,047 deals at facility level. My 
goal is to create a dummy variable that represents whether or not a bank loan is 
available for a firm for a particular year. Each facility from the database has active date 
of the loan, from which I infer starting year of the loan. The maturity of the loans is 
sometimes missing. When this happens, I assume the maturity to be 4 years, which is 
the median maturity for LPC loans. I expand the data to facility*year level and only 
keep those observations that have the value of bank availability dummy as 1. I 
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aggregate the data from facility to firm level represented by gvkey. This results in 
53,120 firm*year level observations with bank availability dummy as 1.  
SDC database serves the same purpose as LPC data, although there is some 
loss of observation from its mapping to Compustat data. For each deal, I have 
information on the close date, announce date and maturity of the deal. I use ‘close date’ 
of the deal to generate starting year of the loan. When it is absent, use ‘announce date’ 
instead. For the maturity of each loan, again, if the maturity is missing, I assume the 
maturity of the loan to be 4 years, as in the case of LPC data. With this method, for the 
sample period of 1990 to 2009, I obtain 28,763 deals from SDC. I drop a deal if neither 
cusip nor ticker is present since I cannot match them with Compustat data. I expand the 
data to deal*year level and only keep those observations that have the value of Bank 
availability dummy as 1. Then I aggregate the data from deal to firm level represented 
by either cusip or ticker, resulting in 11,894 firm*year observations with bank 
availability dummy equaling 1.  
I use Debt Capital Structure data of S&P Capital IQ to determine the amount 
of bank loan a firm has drawn for a specific fiscal year. The S&P Capital IQ platform 
provides attributes of each debt component of a firm, including security type, maturity 
date, interest rate, etc. I process the data in the following steps. First, I keep a debt 
component if the security type (“Descriptiontext”) is Revolving Credit, Bank Loans or 
Term Loan. Second, I drop duplicates and only keep one observation by firm 
(“Gvkey”), debt component (“Componentid”), and date (“Periodenddate”). A debt 
component’s fiscal year is inferred by using ‘Periodenddate’ and fiscal year and month 
records of Compustat. Third, if the same debt component is recorded for several times 
for different periods of a particular fiscal year, I take average of these observations. 
This is the first aggregation of the data. The resulting dataset is unique by firm, debt 
component and fiscal year. Fourth, I sum up the drawn amount of several debt 
components of a particular firm for a fiscal year, resulting in a firm*year panel. I 
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append information on amount of drawn debt to my main sample to form independent 
variables on drawn bank loans.  
As one of the control variables, I consider the presence of an institutional 
blockholder. For this purpose, I obtain information on institutional holdings from SEC 
13F quarterly filings provided by Thomson Reuters, between 1990 and 2009. 
Institutional ownership for a particular firm is created as the ratio of shares held by 
institutions to total shares outstanding from CRSP. I define blockholder dummy as one 
if the largest shareholder has more than 5% of share of the firm in a particular quarter, 
and only keep those firm*quarter level observations that have this dummy as one. Then 
I aggregate the data to annual level for each firm, and assign block dummy with the 
value of one if during anytime of the calendar year t, the firm had at least one 
blockholder. This results in 102,591 firm*year level observations.  
 
3.2   Mapping to Compustat Data 
I construct my base sample using Compustat. To allow three-year lagged variables in 
regression, I restrict the Compustat data sample period between 1987 and 2009.  I 
exclude financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999), and require that a firm in 
the sample is a US public firm. I add ratings information and delete an observation if 
its rating belongs to 'D', 'N.M.' or 'SD', obtaining 255,636 firm*year level observations 
in total. I also generate rating dummy from Compustat Rating file where rating dummy 
takes the value of 1 when the firm is rated by S&P for that particular year, and the 
variable recording number of business segments from Compustat Business Information 
File. I filter out observations when either Total Assets (“At”) or Sales (“Sale”) is 
missing. 
For SDC data, I rely on CRSP database to link companies to Compustat data. 
SDC has ncusip as identifier, which changes through time when mergers and 
acquisitions or name changes occur.  Using ncusip provided by SDC, I obtain matching 
cusip from CRSP which stays constant throughout time, then map CRSP cusip to 
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Compustat gvkey. When ncusip is missing for SDC data, I user ticker instead, and keep 
an observation only when a ticker can map to a unique ticker in CRSP. Then I use the 
matching CRSP cusip to obtain Compustat gvkey. When I consolidate SDC data 
identified by either ncusip or ticker, I obtain 31,430 firm*year level observations in 
total.  
As for the LPC data, it already has gvkey which is unique identifier for 
Compustat, so one-to-one mapping is possible. LPC data have 53,120 firm*year level 
observations in total. In both SDC and LPC data, I drop observations that are not 
mapped to gvkey. I consolidate firm*year level observations between SDC and LPC 
data, arriving at 73,522 total observations with the positive bank availability dummy. 
Finally, I append these observations with the positive bank availability dummy to the 
universe of Compustat firm*year observations that fall between 1990 and 2009. This 
results in 219,442 firm*year observations. 
Institutional data from 13F database is also identified by ncusip, so I use CRSP 
data to map institutional holdings data to Compustat data. Observations that are not 
mapped to Compustat gvkey are dropped.  
 
3.3   Further Data Cleaning Steps 
After filtering by total assets (At) and sales (Sale), I take further data cleaning steps. I 
adjust the level variables by CPI data, transforming values into 2001 dollars. I append 
Country and State of Incorporation information from Compustat and keep an 
observation only when the country the firm incorporated in is the U.S. This brings down 
the number of observation to 179, 834.  
I generate industry level variables by matching firms’ four-digit SIC codes at 
the end of fiscal year to the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classification. 
Observations with missing industry classification are dropped. I drop data for year 1987, 
1988 and 1989. This brings down number of observations from to 158,753. 
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Concerns that some industries may have too small number of firms are 
addressed in the following way. An industry is deleted if the number of firms per year 
never exceeded 10. If an industry has less than 10 firms when it first appears in the data 
but starts to have more than 10 firms, I keep observations from the industry. I keep 
observations from subsequent years unless the number of firms in the industry drops 
below 5. This filtering criterion only deletes 30 observations, results in 155,710 
observations.  
Next, I generate Tobin’s Q (discussed in next section) and other control 
variables, and keep an observation only when all main control variables are present. 
This results in 74, 199 observations in total. Variables are winsorized at 1% of each tail 
to address the issue of outliers. 
 
3.4   Key Variable Definitions 
To explore whether bank financing has a significant effect on firm valuation, I regress 
Tobin’s average Q on bank availability dummy and other industry and firm specific 
variables. Consistent with Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and much of 
the literature, I measure Tobin’s Q as the book value of assets minus the sum of book 
equity and deferred taxes plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book assets. 
This is an approximation of the original definition of Tobin’s Q, which is the market 
value of assets divided by the replacement value of assets. This is due to the fact that I 
do not have information on the replacement value of assets or the market value of debt. 
However, as Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) point out, this measure does avoid ad 
hoc assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates that some other measures of Q 
require. The measure is still likely highly correlated with actual Q, as Chung and Pruitt 
(1994) find that this approximation explains at least 96.6% of the variability of the 
Tobin’s Q of Lindenberg and Ross (1981).  The market value of equity is taken four 
months after the fiscal year end, to allow for the general practice that company annual 
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statement information does not become public until a few months after the fiscal year 
end. All other input information for Tobin’s Q is from the fiscal year end for year t. 
As in Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen (2011), I do industry classification 
according to Fama and French (1997) 48 industries, and generate the industry-median 
adjusted Q as an alternative dependent variable. 
For dependent variable Qit, I test the model with both raw Tobin’s Q and 
industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q. I obtain qualitatively similar results by using 
either of these two dependent variables, so except for baseline results, I only choose to 
present the results with raw Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. Bank availability 
dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has bank loan granted to itself 
for a specific calendar year. It could be in the form of term loan or revolving credit. As 
additional independent variables, I create three versions of drawn debt variable. First 
is drawn-bank-loan-dummy. If a firm has drawn bank loans in a particular year, this 
dummy variable takes the value of 1. The second one is a ratio variable created by the 
amount of drawn bank loans divided by total assets. The third variable is again a ratio 
variable created by the amount of drawn bank loans divided by total debt. 
For control variables, I include variables that I expect to affect Tobin’s Q. As 
in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), I enter blockholder dummy (Block dummy) 
since blockholders have monitoring roles that are expected to benefit the firm value. 
When the dependent variable is raw Q, I enter the industry median Q to control for the 
effect of the industry level valuation. As in  Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick  (2003), I control for the size by using natural log of the book value 
of assets, adjusted to year 2001 dollars. I expect the effect to be negative considering 
how Tobin’s Q is constructed in this paper. Also as in Anderson and Reeb (2003), and 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), I control for firm age, where age is measured as 
the number of years it has been since the firm has first appeared at Compustat. I expect 
a similar effect of the age as the size on firm valuation.  
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Since a company’s profitability has an important implication for its market 
value, I include lagged return on assets (ROA) as an explanatory variable. This is 
similar to the practice by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), and Yermack (1996).  
The number of business segments proxies for diversification of a firm. 
Researchers such as Lang and Stultz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) show that 
diversified firms are valued lower in capital markets compared to stand-alone 
businesses. I enter Number of Business Segments as an explanatory variable to control 
for firm diversification. This variable represents the number of business segments for 
which firms report the annual financial statement, and the data comes from Compustat 
Business Information File.  
I also enter the ratio of fixed asset to total book assets (PPE) to control for the 
firm assets’ tangibility. The intangible asset, which is calculated to be 1 minus the ratio 
of fixed assets, is shown to have positive correlation with firm’s Tobin’s Q in Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2008). I expect the effect of the fixed asset ratio to be negative on 
the firm’s Q ratio. 
Risk negatively affects firm valuation, all else equal. As in Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), I control for risk by using total volatility, 
which is defined as the standard deviation of the daily stock return for each firm year. 
I control for growth opportunities by using the ratio of research and 
development (R&D) expenses to total assets. R&D is coded as zero when the value is 
missing, and I add missing R&D dummy to control for this effect.  




CHAPTER 4   BANK FINANCING AND FIRM VALUATION 
In this Chapter, I provide summary statistics, multivariate analysis and robustness test. 
 
4.1   Summary Statistics 
To create summary statistics, I restrict the sample to years between 1990 and 2009, 
resulting in 74,199 firm*year observations in total. Panel A of Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics for the entire sample. Panel B presents the summary statistics for 
the two groups classified by availability of bank financing.  
In panel A, we see that we have 74,199 valid observations with Tobin’s Q in 
the sample. Out of them, 34% of the observations have access to bank financing, 63% 
of them have the presence of blockholders, and 22% of them are from firms rated by 
S&P.  
Panel B presents the difference of means tests for the sample with and without 
available bank financing. In panel B, we see that observations without available bank 
financing have much higher mean Tobin’s Q (2.20 vs. 1.64). Univariate evidence seems 
to suggest that the presence of bank loans is associated with low firm valuation. If this 
is true, the hypothesis H1 will be rejected. We will look at further evidence to see if 
this is indeed the case. Leverage is higher for firms with bank loans, which might hint 
at better access to debt financing for firms with an established banking relationship. 
Block dummy is much higher for firms with available bank financing, as well as other 
variables that correlate with the firm size such as the firm age. More observations with 
bank financing are rated by S&P, suggesting better credit worthiness for firms with 
available bank financing. Total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility are both higher 






4.2   Multivariate Analysis 
4.2.1  Aggregate Effect of Bank Financing on Firm Valuation - H0 and H1 
To explore whether bank financing availability has a significant effect on firm 
valuation, I regress Tobin’s average Q on bank availability dummy and other industry 
and firm specific variables. My specification for investigating the Null Hypothesis and 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
            ititit riablesControl VaybilityDummBankAvaliaQ   )()(10 .     (1) 
For dependent variable Qit, I test the model with both raw Tobin’s Q and 
industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q. I obtain qualitatively similar results by using 
either of these two dependent variables, so I only choose to present the results with raw 
Tobin’s Q as dependent variable, except for the baseline results. 
BankAvailabilityDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has bank loan 
available for a specific calendar year.  
 I use a two-way fixed effects model to estimate specification (1), and present 
the results in Table 2 with t-statistics presented in parenthesis. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at firm levels and possible endogeneity coming from omitted 
variables, I estimate equation (1) with firm fixed-effects with errors clustered at firm 
level. Since I am not using any macroeconomic variables as controls to address changes 
in the macroeconomic conditions, I have year fixed-effects to control for this time-
series effect. I estimate 10 models for equation (1). Model (1) to (5) use Tobin’s Q as 
the dependent variable, while Model (6) to (10) use industry-median adjusted Tobin’s 
Q as the dependent variable. The coefficient on bank availability dummy is positive 
and significant at 1% level in all of the 10 models, with the magnitude ranging from 
0.08 to 0.10. Thus, the coefficient on bank availability dummy is robust to different 
specifications for controls and for the choice of raw Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q. This result is also economically significant and suggests that Tobin’s Q for 
firms with available bank financing is 7.2 percent higher than those without bank 
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financing (the coefficient estimate of bank financing in Model 5 (0.09) divided by 
median Tobin’s Q of the sample (1.31)). For the rest of the multivariate analysis, I use 
Model (5) of Table 2 as the baseline specification. 
The coefficient estimates for other control variables in Table 2 are mostly 
consistent with the expected directions. Blockholder dummy is negative and significant 
in Model (5) and (10), consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003). Since blockholder 
dummy could be endogenous, I tried two versions of the baseline model where I either 
include or exclude blockholder dummy, and the coefficient on bank availability dummy 
was robust to this test. The estimate on industry median Q is positive and significant, 
which is to be expected due to high similarities of firms in the same industry. The 
estimate on log (total assets) is negative and significant. Since log (total assets) is used 
as a proxy for size, it is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q by construction. Firm age 
also has a negative and significant coefficient as well. The variable that proxies for 
growth opportunities, the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets, 
has a highly positive and significant estimate, signaling the importance of controlling 
for growth opportunity. The coefficient on total volatility is negative and significant as 
expected, since high risk hurts firm valuation. Firm’s intangibility is expected to have 
positive association with firm value. Tangibility in Table 2 has a negative and 
significant coefficient, consistent with the prior findings. Past ROA has a negative and 
insignificant coefficient in both of the more sophisticated baseline, Model (5) and 
Model (10).  Firms with higher number of business segments have insignificant 
coefficients.  
 
4.2.2  Cross-Sectional Analysis – Multivariate Tests of H2A and H2B 
I use the following specifications for the cross-sectional tests in Hypothesis 2:  
























 InfoAsym and FinConstr are proxies for information asymmetry and financing 
constraints, respectively. Variables that are used as these proxies are all defined in 
detail in the appendix. 
In Panel A of Table 3, I report the estimation results of specification (2), cross-
sectional analysis of the interaction between bank financing and variables that proxy 
for information asymmetry.  Of these proxies, those that represent low information 
asymmetry are: large firm dummy, rating dummy, firm age, tangibility; and those that 
represent high information asymmetry are: R&D, total volatility and idiosyncratic 
volatility. To support H2A, firms with low information asymmetry should benefit more 
compared to those with high information asymmetry among the universe of firms with 
available bank financing. To support H2B I should get opposite signs. I refer to prior 
literature such as Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) for the choice of proxies for 
information asymmetry. I enter these proxies directly as control variables in estimating 
specification (2). Other control variables in Model (5) of Table 2 are also used in the 
empirical estimation but are not reported in this Panel A to conserve space. 
Consequently, I only report the independent variable and interaction terms in this panel. 
To answer the question of ‘What is the overall effect of bank financing for 
firms with high/low information asymmetry?’, I report the sum of the direct effect of 
bank financing and the indirect effect coming from the interaction terms in Panel B of 
Table 3. For example, we can see that for firms with low information asymmetry 
measured by rating dummy being 1, the overall effect of bank financing is 0.17. When 
information asymmetry is high (the firm does not have rating), the overall effect of 
bank financing is 0.07. 
The results generally support my prediction in H2A, and reject H2B, and 
support that non-opaque firms benefit more from having bank loans. These results are 
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at odds with the prediction of hypothesis H2B, where firms with high information 
asymmetry should benefit more from the information-friction reducing function of 
bank financing. Except large firm dummy, R&D and total volatility, all the interactions 
with other proxies for information asymmetry have significant coefficients with 
expected signs. These include rating dummy, firm age, tangibility and idiosyncratic 
volatility. For example, Tobin’s Q for firms with no rating but with bank financing 
available is 0.10 lower compared to firms with rating and with bank financing available.  
The coefficients for the interaction between bank financing and large firm dummy, 
R&D or total volatility have expected negative sign but are insignificant. 
The main independent variable, bank availability dummy, has 5 positive and 
significant coefficients out of 7 specifications, and has insignificant coefficients for the 
rest two specifications. 
In Panel A of Table 4, I report the estimation results of specification (3), cross-
sectional analysis of the interaction between bank financing and variables that proxy 
for financing constraints. I refer to Denis and Sibilkov (2010) for a potential choice of 
proxies for financial constraints. All these proxies in Panel A represent low financing 
constraints. To support H2A, firms with low financing constraints should benefit more 
compared to those high financing constraints among the universe of firms with bank 
financing available.  To support H2B I should get opposite signs. As in the case of 
Table 3, I enter these proxies directly as the control variables in estimating specification 
(3). Other controls variables in Model (5) of Table 2 are also used in the empirical 
estimation but are not reported here to conserve space. Consequently, I only report the 
independent variable and interaction terms in this panel. 
As in the case of Table 3, results in Table 4 generally support H2A, and reject 
H2B, that firms with low financing constraints benefit more from bank financing, and 
having bank loans available doesn’t bring positive incremental value for firms with 
high financing constraints. Except quick ratio, interest coverage ratio and dividend 
dummy, all the interactions with other proxies for financing constraints have significant 
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coefficients with positive signs. These include payout ratio, high payout dummy and 
low bankruptcy dummy. For example, Tobin’s Q for firms with high payout dummy 
(highest 3 deciles sorted by payout ratio) but with bank financing is 0.066 higher 
compared to firms with lower payout ratio with bank financing.  The coefficients for 
the interaction between bank financing and quick ratio, coverage ratio or dividend 
dummy have expected positive sign but are insignificant. 
Again, in Panel B of Table 4, I report the sum of the direct effect of bank 
financing and the indirect effect of the interaction terms. 
My baseline results are again robust in Table 4. The main independent variable, 
bank availability dummy, has 4 positive and significant coefficients out of 6 
specifications, and has insignificant but positive coefficients for the rest two 
specifications. 
 
4.3   Controlling for Endogeneity and Selection Bias   
In this section, I adjust for endogeneity and selection bias to see if the positive and 
significant aggregate effect of bank financing on firm valuation still holds after such 
corrections. 
 
4.3.1  Instrument Variable Regression – 2SLS 
A potential issue with the results of the baseline model is that the bank’s decision to 
offer bank loan might be endogenous. Banks may prefer firms with higher valuation. 
In this case, Bank availability dummy is a choice variable that is correlated with 
unobservables that affect firm’s valuation Q. Thus, Bank availability dummy is 
endogenous.  
I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to correct for this endogeneity 
bias. For the instrument variables, I use lagged version of the following candidates: the 
proportion of firm*year observations with bank financing in a Fama-French 48 industry, 
and the proportion of rated firm*year observations in a Fama-French 48 industry. The 
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first instrument variable should have strong identifying power, since an industry’s 
proportion of bank financing should be strongly correlated with the acquisition of bank 
financing of a firm that belongs to this industry. Moreover, I expect that this IV satisfies 
the exclusion restriction since I control for industry level effect on bank financing by 
controlling for industry median Q. Thus I expect that this IV is uncorrelated with 
unobservables that affect firm’s Tobin’s Q. I expect the second instrument to have 
identifying power as well, although to a lesser degree compared to the first IV. A firm’s 
ability to obtain a bank loan is correlated with the level of credit quality in the industry, 
and the proportion of rated firms in an industry is just the measure for the level of credit 
quality for the industry. In similar reasoning to the first IV, I expect this IV to satisfy 
the exclusion restriction. 
I am inspired for these IVs by Santos and Winton (2008). To correct for access 
to bond markets, they use the instrument variable of the percentage of firms in the given 
firm’s two-digit SIC code industry that have issued their most recent bonds publicly. I 
define the industry proportion of bank dummy (t-1) as the proportion of banks in a 
particular FF48 industry that has outstanding bank loan for calendar year (t-1).  
The first stage regression does a least squares regression of bank availability 
dummy on the instrument variables and the rest of the controls. The fitted value of bank 
availability dummy is then used in place of bank availability dummy in the second 
stage. Angrist (2001) has shown that this estimation methodology generates consistent 
estimates even when the first stage dependent variable is binary. I have industry fixed-
effects and year fixed-effects in both stages of estimation. Errors are again clustered at 
firm level. 
I present the results of 2SLS in Panel A of Table 5.  In Model (1) and (2), I use 
the industry proportion of bank loan (t-1) and industry proportion of rated firms (t-1), 
respectively. In Model (3), I use both of these IVs. I conduct the endogeneity test for 
all of the three models, and do the over-identification test for Model (3). We can see 
that both of the choices of IVs are effective in predicting bank availability dummy in 
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the first stage in all three models. All models show bank availability dummy as 
endogenous, with p-value of the test less than 0.002. Since I have two IVs for one 
endogenous regressor in Model (3), the model is overidentified and I am able to do the 
over-identification test in Model (3). The test fails to reject the null that the two IVs of 
the choice are exogenous, which shows that my choice of instrument variables satisfy 
the exclusion restriction and are not correlated with error term in the baseline equation. 
I also report the results of Stock – Yogo weak identification tests: In all three models, 
the results are significant at the 10% level, meaning my choice of instruments are 
powerful in predicting the single endogenous variable bank availability dummy. The 
coefficients on Bank availability dummy are positive and significant, ranging from 1.08 
to 1.21, which are much larger in magnitude than what we have observed in the baseline 
regression. However, such change is documented in other studies like Berger, 
Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) as well. Again, I have supporting evidence 
for Hypothesis 1 for the aggregate effects of bank loans on firm valuation. 
To see if some time invariant firm-specific factors might be driving the results 
of the IV regression in Panel A of Table 5, I present the results of two stage OLS 
regression with firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in Panel B of Table 52. We 
notice that the coefficients on bank availability dummy are similar in magnitude 
between Panel A and Panel B of Table 5. This means that using industry fixed effects 
instead of firm fixed effects does not change the qualitative outcome of the IV 
regression. Consequently, I use industry fixed effects and year fixed effects only for IV 




                                                 
2 Since I have close to 7000 firm fixed effects, I am not able to use the pre-written IV 
regression function within STATA due to limits within the statistical software. Since the pre-
written program automatically reports results of various identification tests, no test results are 
provided in Panel B, Table 5. 
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4.3.2  Treatment Effect Regression 
I also allow for the possibility that there is selection bias when firms raise bank 
financing vs. when they do not. Selection bias can happen when an individual cannot 
be in both states in the sample. If an individual is in the treatment group, we only 
observe the treatment outcome for this individual. If an individual is in the control 
group, we only observe the outcome without treatment for this individual. It is an issue 
of missing data. I use treatment effect model, i.e., Heckman correction, to address this 
issue. 
In addition to the difference in the definition for the issue of endogeneity vs. 
selection bias, their assumptions on the distribution of error also differ. In IV 2SLS 
regression, one assumption is that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in 
the outcome equation. This assumption is hard to be verified. The treatment effect 
regression, on the other hand, assumes that the error term from the response equation 
and the error term from the selection equation are bivariate normal. Although both 
assumptions are hard to verify, having both bias corrected for adds to the robustness of 
the results. 
The results of the treatment effect regression are presented in Table 6. For the 
selection equation, again I use the industry proportion of bank loan (t-1) and the 
industry proportion of rated firms (t-1) in addition to other controls in Model (5) of 
Table 2 to estimate the probability of selecting bank financing. I have industry fixed-
effects and year fixed-effects in both stages of the estimation. The coefficients on bank 
availability dummy are positive and significant, ranging from 1.6 to 1.8 in Table 6.  
To summarize the results of the instrument variable regression and the 
treatment effect model, I find that having bank financing has a positive effect on firm 
valuation. This supports Hypothesis 1 and rejects the null hypothesis, and shows that 





4.4   Available Bank Loan vs. Drawn Bank Loan 
4.4.1  Available Bank Loan vs. Drawn Bank Loan 
To further investigate the channel of the monitoring and certification power of bank 
financing, I look into the issue of available bank loan vs. drawn bank loan.  
I report the results of my investigations in Table 7. Model (1) to (6) has Tobin’s 
Q as a dependent variable, while Model (7) to (12) has industry-median adjusted 
Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. I use the complete sample to estimate Model (1) to 
(3), while I use the subsample with positive available bank loan (bank availability 
dummy = 1) to estimate Model (4) to (6). Models (7) to (12) have similar specifications.  
It is important to notice that even with the distinction of available bank loan 
and actual drawn loan accounted for, and the incremental effect of drawn bank loan in 
mind, the coefficients on bank availability dummy are positive and significant, and are 
still close to magnitude to the baseline results, ranging from 0.07 to 0.09. The 
coefficients on drawn debt dummy, drawn debt/total assets, and drawn debt/total debt 
are all positive and significant, suggesting that the behavior of firms actually drawing 
loan from banks has additional benefits to firm valuation, in addition to the monitoring 
and certification benefits of bank loan availability. After accounting for drawn bank 
loans, the magnitudes of bank availability dummy are indeed slightly smaller than those 
of the baseline results that range from 0.09 to 1.10. However, the effects of drawn bank 
loan variables are less pronounced for the sample with available bank loans, where only 
one out of three drawn bank loan variables in Model (4) to (6) has a positive and 
significant value.  
In summary, I have supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1 for the aggregate 







4.4.2  Firms’ Reliance on Bank Loan vs. Public Debt 
To understand firms’ reliance on bank loans vs. public debt, I dissect total debts into 
bank loans and public debt, and investigate the effect of bank leverage and public 
leverage on firm valuation. Bank leverage is calculated by drawn bank loan divided by 
total assets. Public leverage is calculated by (total assets - drawn bank loan) divided by 
total assets. As in James (1987) predicted, firms react to bank loan announcements with 
positive and significant firm stock reactions, but react to public debt announcement 
with insignificant or negative announcements. As such, and since the effect of leverage 
on firm valuation is negative in my study, I expect the coefficients on bank debt to be 
less negative compared to the coefficients on public leverage. The results for baseline 
regression with these two leverage measures as controls are reported in Table 8. We 
have strong evidence for the benefit of bank loans. Across the board, while the 
coefficients on bank leverage are positive and significant, the coefficients on public 
leverage are negative and significant. 
 
 4.5   Controlling for Debt Effect 
Seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1982), and Jensen (1986) demonstrate that 
risky debt serves as a costly disciplining mechanism to reduce the agency cost that 
arises from the separation of ownership and control. The natural question that arises is 
whether what we observe as a positive association between Tobin’s Q and bank 
financing is merely a debt effect? Table 9 addresses this question. 
 In Table 9, I analyze the effect of bank financing on firm valuation (H0 and 
H1) by restricting the sample to the observations with either LT debt dummy = 1 or 
Tot debt dummy = 1. LT debt dummy is equal to 1 when the ratio of long term debt to 
total assets is higher than 2%, and Tot debt dummy is equal to 1 when the ratio of total 
debt to total assets is higher than 2%. By restricting the sample with outstanding debt, 
I exclude the debt effect, and can focus on the effect of bank financing. 
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 The findings in Table 9 are consistent with the findings with the main sample 
in Table 2. The coefficients on bank availability dummy for both models are positive 
and significant at 0.06. I do find that controlling for debt effect does reduce the effect 
of bank financing to a certain degree, considering the magnitude on bank availability 
dummy was 0.10 in the baseline model in Table 2. 
 In addition to estimating baseline specification with these debt subsamples, I 
also estimate IV regression and treatment effect regression, and present the results in 
Table 9 as well. The results are largely consistent with the full sample results. 
 In Table 10, I restrict the subsample of firms with outstanding long-term debt 
or total debt, and present the results of cross-sectional tests for H2A and H2B in two 
panels. Panel A has the same specification as Table 3, for the subsample of firm*year 
observations with outstanding long-term debt or total debt. Similar to Table 3, we 
observe some evidence of benefits of bank loans for firms with low information 
asymmetry, but to a lesser degree to what we find for the entire sample. Out of 7 proxies 
for information asymmetry, either 2 or 3 have significant coefficients with expected 
sign for the interaction terms, compared to 4 out of 7 for the full sample. In similar 
fashion, my explanation for these results is that the disciplining effect of debt 
substitutes for the benefit of bank loans to some degree, and as such the incremental 
effect of bank financing is smaller for firms with low information asymmetry in the 
presence of positive debt. 
 The evidence in Panel B of Table 10, which has the same specification as Table 
4 for the subsample of firms with outstanding long-term debt or total debt, is more 
striking. While in Table 4, 3 out of 6 have significant coefficients for the interaction 
terms between bank availability dummy and proxies for low financing constraints, none 






4.6   Economic Significance of Bank Loan 
In Table 2, I discussed that in the baseline result, Tobin’s Q for firms with available 
bank financing is 7.2 percent higher than those without bank financing (the coefficient 
estimate of bank financing in Model 5 (0.09) divided by median Tobin’s Q of the 
sample (1.31)). It would be interesting to do a meta-analysis of this effect, and I list 
economic significance of bank availability dummy under various empirical 
specifications in Panel A of Table 11. As expected, the presence of drawn bank loan 
variables slightly decreases the economic significance of bank loan availability. It 
seems like debt does play an important positive role in mitigating agency problems, 
and the effect of bank loan availability further decreases for the subsample of positive 
long term debt and positive total debt. 
To put the effect of bank financing in context, I also report economic 
significance of other control variables in Panel B of Table 11. The third column 
presents either 1 for a dummy variable, or the value of 1 standard deviation for a 
continuous variable. The fourth column presents economic significance in percentage, 
for either change of 1 unit for a dummy variable, or for change of 1 standard deviation 
for a continuous variable. While having the presence of a block holder reduces firm 
Tobin’s Q by 4.3%, having bank financing increases firm Tobin’s Q by 6.97%. We can 
also tell that firm size, firm age, and R&D have quite strong influence in firm Tobin’s 
Q. 
The economic significance of bank financing is meaningful even when 
compared against other main studies in literature that investigate firm Tobin’s Q. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) find that a one-point difference in their G index was 
negatively associated with an 4.3% difference in Tobin's Q (Table 8). Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) finds that Tobin’s Q in family firms is 10.0% higher than in non-family 





4.7   Robustness Tests    
I have mentioned two robustness tests in the previous section. One is the use of raw 
Tobin’s Q vs. industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. Another is 
the inclusion of Block Dummy. As additional robustness checks, I conduct the 
following analysis. 
 
4.7.1  Modification of Current IVs 
In order to address the possibility that when a firm in question is included in the 
construction of the industry level IV and possibly violates the exogeneity assumption 
of IV, I construct both the industry proportion of bank loan (t-1) and the industry 
proportion of rated firms (t-1) with the firm in question excluded. I find the IV and 
treatment effect model results robust to this change. 
Since the current IV is in a lagged manner in order to prevent the possible 
violation of exogeneity assumption, I also try contemporaneous version of the two IVs. 
The results are again robust to this change.  
 
4.7.2  Subsample of Data with Longer Time Series 
To make sure that results are not driven by firms with short time series, I restrict my 
analysis to the subsample of firms with at least 15 years of time-series. My overall 
results are robust for this subsample. 
 
4.7.3  Robustness Check on Baseline 
I also do various robustness checks on the baseline and present the results in Table 12. 
Having a rating means the firm has access to public debt market, and signals a good 
quality. It would be important to control for rating dummy in order to control for access 
to the public debt market. I control for rating dummy and report the results in Model 
(1). The coefficient is 0.094, which is quite close to coefficient of my main specification, 
which is 0.099. 
37 
 
Various variables are thought to proxy for growth opportunities or the 
intangible value included in Tobin’s Q. They include R&D (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2008; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani, 2000), and 
advertising expense (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani, 
2000). I have already controlled for R&D expenses, and I will additional control for 
advertising expenses as a robustness check. In Model (2), I present the results. All 
control variables from Model (5) of Table 2 are controlled for, but are not presented to 
conserve space. 
Since many firms have missing values for R&D and Advertising, I code the 
advertising expense in the same manner as the R&D expense: The advertising expense 
is set as zero if the value is missing, and I have added a missing Ad dummy that is 
equal to 1 when the value is missing. The advertising expense is expected to have a 
positive effect on Tobin’s Q, and previous literature has shown a positive and 
significant coefficient on advertising (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Morck, Nakamura 
and Shivdasani, 2000).  I obtain a positive and significant coefficient on bank 
availability dummy, and the magnitude is comparable to what I have in Table 2. 
Tobin’s Q is considered by some as an ambiguous measure of value-added by 
management, since the variable can also capture the value of future growth 
opportunities. As in Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Yermack (1996), in Model (3), I 
use the contemporaneous measure of the firm level investment (ratio of capital 
expenditures to book value of assets) as a proxy for the future growth opportunities. 
There might be an endogeneity concern, since in testing the Q theory of investment, 
researchers regress the investment intensity on current Tobin’s average Q that proxies 
for the marginal Q. To address this concern, in Models (4), I drop the firm level 
investment and instead use the industry level investment. The firm level investment is 
what’s accrued over the fiscal year, and Tobin’s average Q is calculated in the end of 
the fiscal year. In Model (5), I control for both of the contemporaneous firm and 
industry level investment. To address the concern that the investment might take time 
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to materialize into the share price, I also use lagged firm level investment and lagged 
industry level investment as proxies for growth potential in Model (6), (7), and (8).  
The coefficients on bank availability dummy are robust to all these specifications. They 
are positive and significant, and the magnitude ranges from 0.067 to 0.084. 
As to the effect of investment on Tobin’s Q, the effect is at best ambiguous. It 
depends on how one plus the marginal NPV scaled by its cost compares against the 
average Q of the firm. If the marginal NPV of the additional project has a return to cost 
ratio that is higher than the average Q, then the effect of the additional investment on 
Q should be positive, and vise versa. Anderson and Reeb (2008) find a positive but 
insignificant coefficient (t-statistics is 1.76) on investment, and Morck, Nakamura and 
Shivdasani (2000) find a negative but significant coefficient for investment for 
Japanese firms. Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) argue that if one assumes 
that firms invest in projects according to descending order of the ratio of  the NPV to 
project cost (the authors call it ‘the role of a declining marginal return to investment 
schedule’), then only financially constrained firms will have a higher Q for the 
additional investment.  I find positive and significant coefficients for all four different 
measures of investment, consistent with the US firm data in Anderson and Reeb (2003). 
I also control for the effect of idiosyncratic risks, and exclude the total volatility. 





CHAPTER 5   CONCLUSION 
Is bank loan a special form of debt? There is extensive literature that analyzes firm 
stock reactions to loan announcements within event study context.  The historical 
consensus that the firm stock reaction is always positive is put on a question by a recent 
paper by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011). With a small and limited sample of 800 loans, 
they point out that there is selection bias in the manner that loans are announced, and 
if the sample had been representative, the firm stock reaction to the loan announcement 
would have been insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand, the benefits 
and costs of relationship banking have been extensively analyzed and documented with 
a large sample, mainly in the context of loan contract terms. As such, existing literature 
does not provide a clear indication of what the effect of bank financing on firm 
valuation might be due to disagreements and sample constraints. This paper devotes 
itself to such effort and empirically studies both the aggregate effect of bank financing 
on firm valuation, and the existence of hold-up costs, with a large and comprehensive 
sample. 
This has been a comprehensive study with a large sample of more than 7,000 
firms and more than 70,000 firm*year observations, and covers 20 years of period 
(1990-2009). The sample is general and represents the bank loan universe well since it 
includes both of the loan universe from LPC and SDC, and not just the small number 
of loans that are announced. This has an important implication as to how representative 
and applicable the empirical findings are. 
I find a positive and significant effect of bank financing, more specifically 
available bank financing, on firm valuation. This means that in aggregate, the benefits 
coming from having bank loans, namely the monitoring role, certification role, and the 
ex-ante flexibility of bank loans, outweigh potential costs coming from hold-up cost of 
bank loans. Cross-sectionally, by testing two hypotheses with opposite predictions, I 
find that having bank loans has a negative effect for the valuation of opaque firms and 
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firms with financing constraints. This supports the hold-up cost story for the opaque 
firms and firms with financing constraints. Unlike some evidence in the relationship 
banking literature, my evidence doesn’t support the hypothesis that bank loans are more 
beneficial to the opaque firms.  
The results still stand after going through rigorous robustness tests. I correct 
for the effect of available bank loan vs. drawn bank loan, the effect of incremental 
drawn bank loan vs. bank loan availability as a dummy, the possible effect of debt in 
the capital structure, as well as endogeneity and selection bias, and the results stay 
consistent with the baseline results.   
While most studies on bank financing either look at the announcement effect 
of bank loans on the firm stock reaction within the event study framework with a small 
and potentially biased sample, or the effect of relationship banking on contract terms, 
I use comprehensive and representative panel data to look at the effect of bank 
financing on firm valuation, and the existence of hold-up costs. This fills an important 
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APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF KEY VARIABLES 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value 
of equity) divided by book value of assets. Book value of equity is calculated as the 
sum of book value of common stock (Compustat variable CEQ) and deferred taxes 
(Compustat variable TXDB). Market value of common equity is calculated four months 
after fiscal year-end. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end of year t.  
Bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has bank loan granted to itself for a 
specific calendar year. It could be in the form of term loan or revolving credit.  
Drawn bank loan dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific year, the firm has drawn 
positive net bank loan.  
Drawn bank loan is the amount of drawn net bank loan for a firm for a specific year. 
Advertisement is the advertising expense divided by total assets. 
Altman’s Z-score is calculated according to the following formula:   
54321 9999.0006.0033.0014.0012.0 TTTTTZ  , 
where 
1T  is working capital normalized by total assets, 2T is retained earning 
(Compustat variable RE) normalized by total assets, 
3T  is operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat variable OIBDP) normalized by total assets, 
4T  is market 
value of equity divided by book value of total liabilities (Compustat variable LT), and 
5T  is sales normalized by total assets.  
Bank leverage is calculated as drawn bank loan divided by total assets. 
Block dummy is equal to 1 if the largest shareholder has more than 5% of share of the 
firm in any quarter of a particular calendar year t, data is from Thomson Reuters 13F 
database. 
Coverage ratio is calculated as EBIT divided by interest expenses. 
Dividend dummy is equal to 1 when the firm is not paying any dividend. 
Firm Age is the number of years since the firm appeared in Compustat. 
High payout dummy is equal to 1 when payout ratio (defined in this appendix) belongs 
to the highest 3 deciles. 
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Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residual from a regression that 
regresses daily stock returns on market returns for a particular year. 
Industry median investment is defined where industry is classified according to Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industries. 
Industry median Q is defined where industry is classified according to Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industries. 
Industry proportion of bank loan is the proportion of firms with outstanding bank 
loans in an industry in a particular year, where industry is classified according to Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industries. 
Industry proportion of rated firms is the proportion of firms with credit rating in an 
industry in a particular year, where industry is classified according to Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industries. 
Investment is defined as capital expenditure (Compustat variable CAPEX) normalized 
by total assets. 
Large Firm Dummy is equal to 1 when log(total assets) belongs to the largest 3 deciles. 
Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total 
assets. 
Low bankruptcy dummy is equal to 1 when Altman’s Z score (defined in this 
appendix) belongs to the highest 3 deciles. 
LT debt dummy is equal to 1 when the ratio of long term debt to total assets is higher 
than 2%. 
Missing ad dummy is equal to 1 when the advertising expense is missing in Compustat. 
Missing R&D dummy is equal to 1 when the R&D expense is missing in Compustat. 
Number of segments is the number of business segments for which firms report annual 
financial statement, coming from Compustat Business Information File. 
Payout ratio is the sum of dividend and marketable securities divided by total assets. 
Public leverage is calculated as (total debts - drawn bank loan) divided by total assets. 




Rating dummy is equal to 1 when the firm is rated by S&P for that particular year. 
R&D is the research and development expense divided by total assets. 
ROA is the net income (IBCOM) divided by total assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) to total assets. 
Total assets are the book value of assets of the borrower in millions as reported in 
Compustat, adjusted to year 2001 dollars. 
Tot debt is the sum of long term debt (DLTT) and current debt (DLC). 
Tot debt dummy is equal to 1 when the ratio of total debt to total assets is higher than 
2%. 










Table 1: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the overall sample. Panel B compares 
borrowing firms without bank financing available against firms with bank financing 
available. Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + 
market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common 
equity is calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are 
from the fiscal year end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if the firm has bank 
loan available to itself for a specific calendar year. See the appendix for a detailed 
definition of all variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
  n Mean Median Std 25% 75% 
Q 74199 2.01 1.37 1.95 1.02 2.15 
Bank availability dummy 74199 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Block dummy 74199 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Total assets ($ million) 74199 1461.16 135.77 4871.09 29.99 668.92 
Firm age 74199 17.42 12.00 13.13 7.00 24.00 
Leverage 74198 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.35 
ROA 74199 -0.07 0.03 0.32 -0.06 0.07 
Rating dummy 74199 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
Z score 72733 4.10 3.10 7.48 1.61 5.18 
Investment 74199 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 
Num. segment 74199 1.86 1.00 1.33 1.00 3.00 
Tangibility 74075 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.09 0.42 
R&D 74199 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 
Missing R&D dummy 74199 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Advertisement 74199 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Missing ad dummy 74199 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Quick ratio 71612 2.23 1.36 2.82 0.84 2.41 
Coverage ratio 62936 25.95 5.03 163.03 1.44 13.85 
LT debt dummy 74009 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Tot debt dummy 74198 0.76 1.00 0.43 1.00 1.00 
Total volatility 61146 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Idiosyncratic volatility 61146 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Payout ratio 53893 0.19 0.05 0.38 0.00 0.23 





Table 1 (Continued) 
 





Firms with bank 
loans available     





Q 1.42 2.20 1.31 1.64 0.56*** 44.66 
Block dummy 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.82 -0.28*** -84.41 
Total assets ($ million) 62.49 674.63 638.83 2977.34 -2302.71*** -51.01 
Firm age 11.00 15.39 15.00 21.33 -5.95*** -54.14 
Leverage 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.28 -0.09*** -59.74 
ROA 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.11*** -55.33 
Rating dummy 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.43 -0.32*** -94.14 
Z score 3.23 4.43 2.93 3.46 0.97*** 20.85 
Investment 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.01*** -16.9 
Num. segment 1.00 1.63 1.00 2.30 -0.67*** -60.19 
Tangibility 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.33 -0.06*** -32.95 
R&D 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.05*** 67.07 
Missing R&D dummy 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.48 -0.09*** -23.78 
Advertisement 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00*** -2.76 
Missing ad dummy 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.69 0.00 0.05 
Quick ratio 1.56 2.64 1.14 1.44 1.21*** 69.95 
Coverage ratio 4.23 27.44 6.02 23.55 3.89*** 3.29 
LT debt dummy 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.84 -0.27*** -83.99 
Tot debt dummy 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.90 -0.21*** -75.15 
Total volatility 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01*** 56.39 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01*** 62.4 
Payout ratio 0.03 0.19 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.55 





Table 2: Effect of Bank Financing on Firm Valuation 
 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in Models (1) to (5), and industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q in Models (6) to (10). Tobin’s Q is calculated 
as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is 
calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if 
for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. All models have firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are reported in 




Table 2 (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Q Q Q Q Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q 
Bank availability dummy 
0.097*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 
(3.83) (3.72) (3.71) (3.55) (3.70) (3.77) (3.67) (3.66) (3.50) (3.64) 
log(total assets) -0.725*** -0.730*** -0.717*** -0.660*** -0.714*** -0.694*** -0.698*** -0.686*** -0.630*** -0.692*** 
 (-26.42) (-26.39) (-25.61) (-23.11) (-22.04) (-26.84) (-26.81) (-26.02) (-23.53) (-22.33) 
Block dummy 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.061** -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.064** 
 (0.05) (-0.01) (0.02) (-0.10) (-2.07) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.27) (-2.25) 
Industry median Q 1.212*** 1.208*** 1.205*** 1.214*** 1.355***      
 (19.27) (19.23) (19.22) (19.49) (20.70)      
Firm age -0.042*** -0.037** -0.039** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.056*** 
 (-2.63) (-2.32) (-2.45) (-3.06) (-3.16) (-2.97) (-2.68) (-2.80) (-3.44) (-3.61) 
Leverage -0.192** -0.157* -0.190** -0.204** -0.483*** -0.226*** -0.194** -0.225*** -0.239*** -0.515*** 
 (-2.22) (-1.79) (-2.14) (-2.33) (-5.15) (-2.78) (-2.34) (-2.69) (-2.90) (-5.71) 
Num. Segment  0.016 0.015 0.011 0.011  0.014 0.013 0.009 0.010 
  (1.47) (1.38) (1.04) (1.00)  (1.33) (1.24) (0.89) (0.93) 
Tangibility  -0.335** -0.338** -0.474*** -0.567***  -0.308** -0.311** -0.442*** -0.547*** 
  (-2.54) (-2.56) (-3.62) (-3.98)  (-2.45) (-2.48) (-3.55) (-4.01) 
ROA(t-1)   -0.167** -0.062 -0.022   -0.157** -0.055 -0.026 
   (-2.24) (-0.85) (-0.24)   (-2.23) (-0.81) (-0.30) 
R&D    2.809*** 2.871***    2.725*** 2.776*** 
    (9.03) (8.19)    (9.21) (8.15) 
Missing R&D dummy    -0.013 0.015    -0.010 0.026 
    (-0.23) (0.26)    (-0.18) (0.46) 
Total volatility     -5.390***     -4.996*** 
     (-7.56)     (-7.31) 
Constant 4.207*** 4.274*** 4.240*** 3.956*** 4.633*** 4.376*** 4.432*** 4.396*** 4.133*** 5.018*** 
 (20.40) (20.33) (20.11) (18.51) (18.34) (23.82) (23.65) (23.32) (21.76) (21.80) 
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Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 74198 74074 74074 74074 61054 74198 74074 74074 74074 61054 




Table 3: Cross-sectional Analysis: Effect of Bank Financing for Firms with Variation in Information Asymmetry 
 
This table tests the incremental effect of bank financing for firms with high information asymmetry by estimating the following equation:          
.)()(*)()( 110 ititititit iablesControlVarInfoAsymybilityDummBankAvailaybilityDummBankAvailaQ    
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value 
of common equity is calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability 
dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. 
Other controls variables in Model (5) of Table 2 are also used in the empirical estimation but are not reported here to conserve space. All models 
have firm fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are 




Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Estimation of Interaction Terms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Bank availability dummy 0.067** 0.068** -0.011 0.036 0.100*** 0.118*** 0.155*** 
(2.03) (2.20) (-0.25) (0.83) (3.57) (3.30) (4.26) 
Bank Dummy*large firm dummy 0.066       
(1.48)       
Bank Dummy*rating dummy  0.102**      
 (2.48)      
Bank Dummy*firm age   0.005***     
  (3.50)     
Bank dummy*tangibility    0.206**    
   (2.29)    
Bank dummy*R&D     -0.034   
    (-0.07)   
Bank dummy*total volatility      -0.529  
     (-0.59)  
Bank dummy*idiosyncratic volatility       -1.642* 
      (-1.76) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 61054 61054 61054 61054 61054 61054 61054 





Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Sum of Direct  and Indirect Effect of Bank Availability Dummy 











Proxies for information asymmetry Min 0 0 3 0 0 0.01 0.01 
Max 1 1 55 0.91 0.66 0.12 0.12 
         
Sum of direct effect and interaction effect Min 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.14 





Table 4: Cross-sectional Analysis: Effect of Bank Financing for Firms with Low Financing Constraints 
 
This table tests the incremental effect of bank financing for firms with financing constraints by estimating the following equation:   
.)()(*)()( 110 ititititit iablesControlVarFinConstrybilityDummBankAvailaybilityDummBankAvailaQ    
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value 
of common equity is calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability 
dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. 
Other controls variables in Model (5) of Table 2 are also used in the empirical estimation but are not reported here to conserve space. All models 
have firm fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are 




Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Estimation of Interaction Terms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Bank availability dummy 0.030 0.033 0.087** 0.079*** 0.080** 0.066*** 
 (1.18) (1.21) (2.46) (3.06) (2.35) (2.95) 
Bank Dummy*payout ratio 0.110***      
(3.15)      
Bank dummy*high payout dummy  0.066**     
 (2.23)     
Bank dummy*quick ratio   0.006    
   (0.40)    
Bank dummy*coverage ratio    0.000   
    (0.44)   
Bank dummy*dividend dummy     0.055  
    (1.37)  
Bank dummy*Low bankruptcy 
dummy 
     0.066* 
      (1.73) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 46654 46654 59063 52251 61054 60181 





Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Sum of Direct  and Indirect Effect of Bank Availability Dummy 













Proxies for financing constraint Min 0 0 0.12 -552.4 0 0 
Max 2.52 1 18.99 1174.5 1 1 
        
Sum of direct effect and interaction effect Min 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Max 0.31 0.10 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.13 
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Table 5: Controlling for Endogeneity of Bank Financing - IV Regression 
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value 
of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is calculated 
at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year 
end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm 
has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. All 
models have Industry fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the 
table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are reported in 







Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: IV Regression: Industry Fixed Effects and Year Fixed Effects 













  1.086***   1.215***   1.081*** 
 (5.12)  (3.25)  (5.13) 
Industry proportion 
of bank loan (t-1) 
0.713***    0.743***  
(16.38)    (14.98)  
Industry proportion 
of rated firms (t-1) 
  0.587***  -0.094  
  (7.94)  (-1.16)  
log(total assets) 0.093*** -0.156*** 0.093*** -0.168*** 0.093*** -0.155*** 
 (32.60) (-6.89) (32.41) (-4.58) (32.61) (-6.91) 
Block dummy 0.054*** -0.285*** 0.055*** -0.292*** 0.054*** -0.285*** 
 (6.64) (-7.71) (6.85) (-7.21) (6.65) (-7.71) 
Industry median Q 0.002 1.374*** 0.006 1.373*** 0.002 1.374*** 
 (0.15) (20.92) (0.61) (20.81) (0.19) (20.93) 
Firm age -0.000 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.009*** 
 (-1.18) (-8.42) (-1.12) (-8.33) (-1.16) (-8.42) 
Leverage 0.409*** -1.558*** 0.410*** -1.611*** 0.409*** -1.556*** 
 (18.80) (-13.37) (18.83) (-9.39) (18.79) (-13.40) 
Num. Segment 0.013*** -0.044*** 0.015*** -0.046*** 0.013*** -0.044*** 
 (4.20) (-4.94) (4.57) (-4.69) (4.22) (-4.93) 
Tangibility 0.032 -0.219*** 0.038 -0.224*** 0.032 -0.219*** 
 (1.31) (-2.87) (1.55) (-2.92) (1.31) (-2.87) 
ROA(t-1) -0.006 -0.730*** 0.005 -0.732*** -0.005 -0.730*** 
 (-0.44) (-6.63) (0.40) (-6.63) (-0.43) (-6.62) 
R&D -0.239*** 4.450*** -0.245*** 4.481*** -0.238*** 4.448*** 
 (-6.36) (17.03) (-6.50) (16.46) (-6.35) (17.03) 
Missing R&D 
dummy 
0.021** -0.096*** 0.021* -0.098*** 0.021** -0.096*** 
(1.97) (-2.87) (1.93) (-2.90) (1.98) (-2.87) 
Total volatility 0.530*** -9.270*** 0.670*** -9.364*** 0.530*** -9.267*** 
 (3.11) (-11.21) (3.93) (-10.91) (3.11) (-11.21) 
Constant -0.517*** 1.052*** -0.361*** 1.082*** -0.508*** 1.051*** 
 (-15.82) (6.81) (-10.98) (6.31) (-14.87) (6.81) 
Industry Fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 53672 53672 53672 53672 53672 53672 
Adj. R-squared 0.323 0.234 0.316 0.233 0.323 0.234 
Endogeneity test of 
Bank availability 
dummy (p-value)  0.0000   0.0012  0.0000 
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Hansen J statistic 
(Overidentification 
test) (p-value)  N/A  N/A  0.6556 
Stock-Yogo weak 




IV Size is 




IV Size is 








Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: 2SLS Regression: Firm Fixed Effects and Year Fixed Effects 














  1.220***   1.166**   1.221*** 





0.581***    0.592***  





  0.447***  -0.039  
  (5.40)  (-0.44)  
log(total 
assets) 0.075*** -0.750*** 0.072*** -0.746*** 0.074*** -0.750*** 
 (10.87) (-17.32) (10.41) (-13.74) (10.86) (-17.34) 
Block 
dummy 0.008 -0.062** 0.009 -0.062** 0.008 -0.062** 
 (1.06) (-1.99) (1.14) (-1.98) (1.06) (-1.99) 
Industry 
median Q -0.005 1.279*** -0.004 1.278*** -0.005 1.279*** 
 (-0.53) (18.83) (-0.38) (18.83) (-0.53) (18.83) 
Firm age -0.011 -0.026 -0.018** -0.027 -0.011 -0.026 
 (-1.27) (-1.59) (-2.04) (-1.50) (-1.26) (-1.59) 
Leverage 0.247*** -0.768*** 0.252*** -0.754*** 0.247*** -0.768*** 
 (9.90) (-6.38) (9.99) (-4.53) (9.89) (-6.39) 
Num. 
Segment 0.012*** -0.011 0.014*** -0.010 0.012*** -0.011 
 (3.30) (-0.92) (3.66) (-0.74) (3.31) (-0.92) 
Tangibility -0.036 -0.504*** -0.038 -0.507*** -0.036 -0.504*** 
 (-0.95) (-3.37) (-1.00) (-3.34) (-0.96) (-3.37) 
ROA(t-1) 0.008 -0.038 0.012 -0.038 0.008 -0.038 
 (0.63) (-0.38) (0.90) (-0.37) (0.64) (-0.38) 
R&D 0.116*** 2.979*** 0.112** 2.985*** 0.117*** 2.979*** 
 (2.60) (7.68) (2.47) (7.63) (2.60) (7.68) 
Missing R&D 
dummy 
0.013 -0.000 0.015 0.001 0.013 -0.000 
(0.70) (-0.00) (0.78) (0.01) (0.69) (-0.00) 
Total 
volatility 0.679*** -5.283*** 0.812*** -5.236*** 0.680*** -5.284*** 
 (4.16) (-6.54) (5.00) (-5.84) (4.17) (-6.55) 
Constant -0.308*** 4.711*** -0.299*** 4.699*** -0.302*** 4.711*** 
 (-3.09) (15.96) (-3.01) (15.07) (-3.04) (15.97) 
Firm Fixed 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Obs. 53672 53672 53672 53672 53672 53672 
Adj. R-




Table 6: Controlling for Selection Bias of Bank Financing:  
Treatment Effect Regression 
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value 
of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is calculated 
at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year 
end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm 
has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. All 
models have industry fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the 
table. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 











Bank availability dummy  1.557***  1.760***  1.553*** 
  (18.25)  (18.58)  (18.22) 
Industry proportion of 
bank loan (t-1) 
1.955***    2.043***  
(19.09)    (17.15)  
Industry proportion of 
rated firms (t-1) 
  1.462***  -0.289  
  (8.49)  (-1.45)  
log(total assets) 0.312*** -0.199*** 0.311*** -0.218*** 0.313*** -0.199*** 
 (64.79) (-20.91) (64.69) (-21.14) (64.80) (-20.89) 
Block dummy 0.238*** -0.311*** 0.244*** -0.323*** 0.239*** -0.311*** 
 (14.00) (-16.06) (14.36) (-16.23) (14.01) (-16.05) 
Industry median Q 0.009 1.369*** 0.031 1.367*** 0.010 1.369*** 
 (0.24) (34.82) (0.86) (34.09) (0.27) (34.84) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.30) (-13.35) (-3.22) (-12.98) (-3.24) (-13.36) 
Leverage 1.365*** -1.751*** 1.362*** -1.835*** 1.366*** -1.750*** 
 (35.45) (-30.93) (35.42) (-30.71) (35.46) (-30.92) 
Num. Segment 0.037*** -0.052*** 0.040*** -0.055*** 0.037*** -0.052*** 
 (7.23) (-8.32) (7.72) (-8.62) (7.25) (-8.31) 
Tangibility 0.121*** -0.238*** 0.140*** -0.246*** 0.121*** -0.238*** 
 (3.06) (-5.19) (3.55) (-5.26) (3.04) (-5.19) 
ROA(t-1) 0.078* -0.735*** 0.109** -0.737*** 0.078* -0.735*** 
 (1.71) (-16.61) (2.40) (-16.33) (1.71) (-16.61) 
R&D -1.484*** 4.565*** -1.520*** 4.615*** -1.483*** 4.564*** 
 (-12.72) (42.95) (-13.00) (42.43) (-12.71) (42.96) 
Missing R&D dummy 0.055*** -0.105*** 0.053*** -0.110*** 0.055*** -0.105*** 
(3.18) (-5.30) (3.07) (-5.40) (3.18) (-5.30) 
Total volatility 1.938*** -9.613*** 2.325*** -9.760*** 1.942*** -9.610*** 
 (4.42) (-20.29) (5.32) (-20.17) (4.42) (-20.29) 
Constant -3.331*** 1.741*** -3.040*** 1.797*** -3.285*** 1.740*** 
 (-26.20) (12.53) (-23.36) (12.65) (-25.07) (12.52) 
Hazard lambda  -0.935***  -1.052***  -0.933*** 
  (-18.54)  (-18.83)  (-18.52) 
Industry Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 7: The Effect of Available Bank Debt vs. Drawn Bank Debt on Firm Valuation 
 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in Models (1) to (6), and industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q in Models (7) to (12). Tobin’s Q is calculated 
as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is 
calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if 
for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. Bank drawn dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm has 
drawn positive net bank loan. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. All models have firm fixed effects and year fixed effects 
that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate 




Table 7 (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 













Bank availability dummy 
0.087*** 0.094*** 0.075***    0.083*** 0.090*** 0.071***    
(3.27) (3.50) (2.91)    (3.19) (3.43) (2.84)    
Drawn debt dummy 
0.170***   0.031   0.173***   0.027   
(5.68)   (1.22)   (5.90)   (1.11)   
Drawn debt/total assets 
 0.378***   0.027   0.386***   0.020  
 (5.10)   (0.41)   (5.29)   (0.30)  
Drawn debt/ total debt 
  0.104***   0.089**   0.106***   0.088*** 
  (3.18)   (2.57)   (3.31)   (2.60) 
log(total assets) 
-0.715*** -0.713*** -0.629*** -0.595*** -0.594*** -0.549*** -0.693*** -0.691*** -0.613*** -0.584*** -0.583*** -0.540*** 
(-22.06) (-22.02) (-19.18) (-13.10) (-13.09) (-12.03) (-22.35) (-22.31) (-19.45) (-13.35) (-13.34) (-12.29) 
Block dummy 
-0.060** -0.060** -0.046* -0.013 -0.013 -0.029 -0.063** -0.063** -0.048* -0.016 -0.016 -0.030 
(-2.05) (-2.01) (-1.65) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.91) (-2.22) (-2.19) (-1.78) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.98) 
Industry median Q 
1.345*** 1.350*** 1.222*** 0.785*** 0.785*** 0.731***       
(20.64) (20.67) (17.95) (11.52) (11.52) (10.99)       
Firm age 
-0.048*** -0.056*** -0.011 -0.025* -0.026* -0.016 -0.052*** -0.061*** -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.012 
(-3.01) (-3.45) (-0.74) (-1.73) (-1.77) (-1.13) (-3.45) (-3.91) (-0.89) (-1.48) (-1.51) (-0.86) 
Leverage 
-0.529*** -0.534*** -0.421*** -0.518*** -0.513*** -0.418*** -0.561*** -0.566*** -0.448*** -0.506*** -0.502*** -0.404*** 
(-5.64) (-5.64) (-4.40) (-5.07) (-4.98) (-4.20) (-6.22) (-6.22) (-4.86) (-5.02) (-4.94) (-4.11) 
Num. Segment 
0.010 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.002 
(0.86) (1.06) (0.12) (0.26) (0.29) (0.01) (0.78) (0.99) (0.00) (0.37) (0.40) (0.16) 
Tangibility 
-0.584*** -0.583*** -0.425*** -0.259* -0.255* -0.184 -0.564*** -0.563*** -0.417*** -0.251* -0.247* -0.178 
(-4.09) (-4.09) (-3.03) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.27) (-4.13) (-4.13) (-3.10) (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.26) 
ROA(t-1) 
-0.029 -0.029 -0.044 0.356** 0.355** 0.272* -0.033 -0.033 -0.043 0.344** 0.344** 0.265* 
(-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.45) (2.37) (2.37) (1.80) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.46) (2.38) (2.37) (1.81) 
R&D 
2.845*** 2.845*** 2.940*** 3.489*** 3.495*** 3.168*** 2.751*** 2.751*** 2.854*** 3.395*** 3.401*** 3.065*** 
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(8.16) (8.15) (7.12) (3.12) (3.12) (2.75) (8.11) (8.11) (7.14) (3.15) (3.16) (2.77) 
Missing R&D dummy 
0.011 0.013 0.012 0.098* 0.099* 0.091 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.105* 0.106* 0.096* 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.20) (1.65) (1.67) (1.56) (0.38) (0.43) (0.41) (1.81) (1.83) (1.70) 
Total volatility 
-5.573*** -5.422*** -4.934*** -2.594*** -2.568*** -2.663*** -5.186*** -5.030*** -4.650*** -2.503*** -2.481*** -2.581*** 
(-7.82) (-7.62) (-7.23) (-2.81) (-2.78) (-2.86) (-7.59) (-7.37) (-7.03) (-2.78) (-2.76) (-2.84) 
Constant 4.656*** 4.696*** 3.986*** 4.603*** 4.596*** 4.289*** 5.027*** 5.076*** 4.200*** 4.221*** 4.216*** 3.847*** 
 (18.46) (18.48) (15.13) (13.03) (13.00) (11.92) (21.93) (21.90) (17.32) (12.49) (12.47) (11.11) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 61005 61005 50710 23540 23540 21987 61005 61005 50710 23540 23540 21987 







Table 8: Firms’ Dependence on Bank Debt vs. Public Debt 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in Models (1) to (5), and industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q in Models (6) to (10). Tobin’s Q is calculated 
as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is 
calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if 
for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. Bank leverage is defined as drawn bank loan amount/ total assets. Public leverage 
is defined as (total debts – drawn bank loan amount)/total assets. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. All models have 
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are reported 




























Table 8 (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Q Q Q Q Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q Adjusted Q 
Bank availability dummy 
0.109*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 
(4.27) (4.17) (4.16) (3.98) (4.03) (4.20) (4.10) (4.09) (3.91) (3.97) 
log(total assets) -0.717*** -0.722*** -0.707*** -0.648*** -0.714*** -0.686*** -0.691*** -0.677*** -0.619*** -0.692*** 
 (-26.11) (-26.07) (-25.32) (-22.78) (-21.91) (-26.50) (-26.46) (-25.68) (-23.16) (-22.21) 
Block dummy -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.057* -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.060** 
 (-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.21) (-1.91) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-0.37) (-2.09) 
Industry median Q 1.209*** 1.205*** 1.202*** 1.212*** 1.349***      
 (19.16) (19.14) (19.12) (19.42) (20.42)      
Firm age -0.045*** -0.040** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.060*** 
 (-2.71) (-2.42) (-2.59) (-3.27) (-3.30) (-3.07) (-2.79) (-2.95) (-3.66) (-3.81) 
Bank leverage 0.247* 0.295** 0.261** 0.251* 0.307** 0.236* 0.280** 0.248** 0.239* 0.280** 
 (1.92) (2.27) (2.00) (1.96) (2.15) (1.90) (2.24) (1.97) (1.93) (2.03) 
Public Leverage -0.384*** -0.352*** -0.389*** -0.410*** -0.533*** -0.401*** -0.371*** -0.406*** -0.427*** -0.562*** 
 (-4.52) (-4.09) (-4.50) (-4.83) (-5.64) (-4.95) (-4.52) (-4.92) (-5.28) (-6.19) 
Num. Segment  0.013 0.012 0.009 0.008  0.011 0.010 0.007 0.007 
  (1.24) (1.15) (0.82) (0.76)  (1.08) (0.99) (0.66) (0.67) 
Tangibility  -0.325** -0.330** -0.467*** -0.585***  -0.299** -0.304** -0.437*** -0.565*** 
  (-2.44) (-2.48) (-3.55) (-4.09)  (-2.37) (-2.41) (-3.49) (-4.13) 
ROA(t-1)   -0.190** -0.083 -0.027   -0.178** -0.074 -0.031 
   (-2.51) (-1.12) (-0.29)   (-2.48) (-1.06) (-0.34) 
R&D    2.861*** 2.825***    2.768*** 2.733*** 
    (9.08) (8.06)    (9.24) (8.03) 
Missing R&D dummy    -0.007 0.020    -0.004 0.031 
    (-0.12) (0.35)    (-0.08) (0.55) 
Total volatility     -5.541***     -5.158*** 
     (-7.68)     (-7.45) 
69 
 
Constant 4.270*** 4.337*** 4.300*** 4.013*** 4.715*** 4.437*** 4.494*** 4.455*** 4.190*** 5.098*** 
 (20.09) (20.05) (19.84) (18.28) (18.28) (23.33) (23.19) (22.88) (21.37) (21.76) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 72014 71891 71891 71891 59486 72014 71891 71891 71891 59486 




Table 9:  How Does the Disciplining Effect of Debt Affect the Effect of 
Bank Financing on Firm Valuation 
 
This table investigate the disciplining effect of debt on the main independent variable: 
bank availability dummy. Two subsamples are considered: first is the sample of firms 
with positive long-term debt, and second is the sample of firms with positive total debt. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value 
of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is calculated 
at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year 
end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm 
has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. Other 
controls variables in Table 2 are also used in the empirical estimation but are not 
reported here to conserve space. All models have firm fixed effects and year fixed 
effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 





LT debt dummy=1, Baseline regression 0.061** 
 (2.54) 
Tot debt dummy=1, Baseline regression 0.064*** 
 (2.60) 
LT debt dummy=1, IV regression, IV1 = Industry proportion of bank loan (t-1) 1.062*** 
 (4.99) 
LT debt dummy=1, IV regression, IV2 =Industry proportion of rated firms (t-1) 1.644*** 
 (4.00) 
LT debt dummy=1, IV regression, IV1 and IV2 from Above 1.030*** 
 (4.93) 
LT debt dummy=1, Treatment effect regression, IV1 = Industry proportion of 
bank loan (t-1) 
1.438*** 
(16.24) 
LT debt dummy=1, Treatment effect regression, IV2 =Industry proportion of 
rated firms (t-1) 
1.715*** 
(16.83) 





Table 10: Cross-sectional Analysis for the Debt Effect 
 
Panel A tests the incremental effect of bank financing for firms with high information asymmetry by estimating the following equation:  
.)()(*)()( 110 ititititit iablesControlVarInfoAsymBankDummyBankDummyQ    
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value 
of common equity is calculated at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability 
dummy is equal to 1 if for a specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. 
Other controls variables in Model (5) of Table 2 are also used in the empirical estimation but are not reported here to conserve space. All models 
have firm fixed effects and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Analysis- Effect of Bank financing for Firms with Variation in Information Asymmetry 
  (1) (2) 
 LT debt dummy=1 Tot debt dummy=1 
  Q Q 
Bank Dummy*large firm dummy -0.005 0.016 
 (-0.11) (0.39) 
Bank Dummy*rating dummy 0.020 0.037 
 (0.56) (1.00) 
Bank Dummy*firm age 0.002 0.003* 
 (1.44) (1.92) 
Bank dummy*tangibility 0.145* 0.179** 
 (1.86) (2.18) 
Bank dummy*R&D -0.810 -0.750 
 (-1.32) (-1.30) 
Bank dummy*total volatility -0.968 -1.153 
 (-1.17) (-1.41) 
Bank dummy*idiosyncratic volatility -1.452* -1.877** 




Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel B tests the incremental effect of bank financing for firms with financing constraints by estimating the following equation:  
.)()(*)()( 110 ititititit iablesControlVarFinConstrBankDummyBankDummyQ    
 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional Analysis - Effect of Bank financing for Firms with Low Financing Constraints 
  (1) (2) 
 LT debt dummy=1 Tot debt dummy=1 
  Q Q 
Bank Dummy*payout ratio 0.046 0.039 
 (1.28) (1.06) 
Bank dummy*high payout dummy 0.027 0.022 
 (1.04) (0.85) 
Bank dummy*quick ratio -0.022 -0.008 
 (-1.01) (-0.36) 
Bank dummy*coverage ratio 0.000 0.000 
 (0.52) (0.23) 
Bank dummy*dividend dummy 0.012 0.024 
 (0.35) (0.67) 
Bank dummy*Low bankruptcy dummy -0.029 0.010 






Table 11:  Economic Significance of Independent Variable and Control Variables 
 
Panel A reports economics significance of main variable Bank availability dummy in various empirical specifications. Economic significance 
is calculated at medium Tobin’s Q. Specification (1) is based on Table 2, column 5; specification (2) is based on Table 7, column 1; specification 
(2) is based on Table 7, column 1; specification (2) is based on Table 7, column 1; specification (2) is based on Table 7, column 1; specification 
(2) is based on Table 7, column 1.  
 
Panel A: Economic Significance of Main Variable in Various Empirical Specifications  
  Empirical specification Variable Coefficient 
Change in % of 
Tobin's Q for 1 
unit change of 
independent 
dummy variable 
(1) Baseline Bank availability dummy 0.099 7.23 
(2) 
Drawn debt considered: drawn 
bank loan dummy 
Bank availability dummy 0.087 6.35 
(3) 
Drawn debt considered: drawn 
bank loan / total assets 
Bank availability dummy 0.094 6.86 
(4) 
Drawn debt considered: drawn 
bank loan / total debt 
Bank availability dummy 0.075 5.47 
(5) Positive long term debt sample Bank availability dummy 0.061 4.45 







Table 11 (Continued) 
Panel B reports economics significance of control variables in baseline specification. 
 





for 1 Unit of Independent 
Variable 
1 unit  for Dummy/ 1 
Standard Deviation for 
Continuous Variable 
Economic Significance in % for 1 unit 
change for a Dummy Variable /1 SD 
Change for a Continuous Variable 
Bank availability dummy 0.099*** 6.97 1 6.97 
     
log(total assets) -0.714*** -50.28 2.21 -111.12 
     
Block dummy -0.061** -4.30 1 -4.30 
     
Industry median Q 1.355*** 95.42 0.46 43.89 
     
Firm age -0.051*** -3.59 13.13 -47.16 
     
Leverage -0.483*** -34.01 0.20 -6.80 
     
Num. Segment 0.011 0.77 1.33 1.03 
     
Tangibility -0.567*** -39.93 0.24 -9.58 
     
ROA(t-1) -0.022 -1.55 0.32 -0.50 
     
R&D 2.871*** 202.18 0.11 22.24 
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Missing R&D dummy 0.015 1.06 0.49 0.52 
     




Table 12: Robustness of Baseline Specification 
 
To save space, only coefficients for new control variables that are not considered in Table 2 are presented. Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book 
value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Market value of common equity is calculated 
at fiscal year-end plus four months. The rest of the variables are from the fiscal year end. A bank availability dummy is equal to 1 if for a 
specific calendar year, the firm has bank loan available. See the appendix for a detailed definition of all variables. Other controls variables in 
Model (5) of Table 2  are also used in the empirical estimation but are not reported here to conserve space. All models have firm fixed effects 
and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Errors are clustered at firm level and resulting t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  




Table 12 (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Bank availability dummy 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
 (3.51) (3.70) (3.66) (3.64) (3.65) (3.01) (2.95) (2.94) (2.97) 
Rating dummy 0.146***         
 (3.41)         
Advertisement  0.564 0.466 0.537 0.459 0.576 0.547 0.544 0.551 
  (0.74) (0.62) (0.70) (0.61) (0.75) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) 
Missing Ad Dummy  0.096** 0.092** 0.094** 0.092** 0.082* 0.081* 0.079* 0.080* 
  (2.22) (2.16) (2.18) (2.15) (1.83) (1.80) (1.77) (1.79) 
Investment   2.146***  2.117***     
   (9.83)  (9.63)     
Industry Median Investment    2.076*** 0.640     
    (2.95) (0.92)     
Investment (t-1)      1.150***  1.056***  
      (5.75)  (5.30)  
Industry Median Investment (t-1)       2.976*** 2.285*** 2.929*** 
       (3.72) (2.87) (3.67) 
Idiosyncratic volatility         -5.210*** 
         (-6.90) 
Constant 4.679*** 4.552*** 4.421*** 4.441*** 4.389*** 4.359*** 4.235*** 4.239*** 4.278*** 
  (18.35) (17.89) (17.43) (17.68) (17.52) (15.74) (15.50) (15.53) (15.63) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 61054 61054 61054 61054 61054 53672 53672 53672 53672 
Adj. R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.547 0.545 0.547 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549 
 
